SZ/AEAF/5/1/4 - The use of air power against transport and military supplies, 7/6/44

SZ/AEAF/5/1/4

Item

The use of air power against transport and military supplies, 7/6/44

1944

18 leaves

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. Intelligence Division. G.2.
Foord, E. J.recipient

SHAEF/561 GX/5/INT

Includes a covering letter signed by Col. E.J. Foord. The paper discusses "from an army intelligence viewpoint the use of Air Power (a) Against the enemy's supply and transport system in the WEST; (b) Against industrial targets whose destruction, it is believed, can directly and immediately weaken the enemy's military potential in the WEST". It concludes that "from an army viewpoint in relation to OVERLORD, the most direct and quick results will be obtained by concentrating an effort on interdiction in FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES and oil and tank engine production in GERMANY and the rest of EUROPE." By interdiction is meant attacks "at a sufficient number of points that it is no longer a profitable proposition... to use them" in contrast to attrition against a system as a whole. The AEAF offensive against rail centres is defined as a programme of attrition and judged to have failed to impair movement of enemy reinforcements although successful in "imposing some slight delay on the throughout speed of rail movement".

Appendix 'A' is an "Estimate of Enemy Supply Requirements, appendix B is a proposed "Interdiction Programme with an extensive list of suggested targets, and appendix C is a paper entitled 'Axis Oil Position'.