SZ/AEAF/4/1/4-5 - Air Attacks on Railways, 25/2/44
SZ/AEAF/4/1/4-5
Item
Air Attacks on Railways, 25/2/44
1944
1 leaf
With covering note from Napier to Air Vice Marshal Wigglesworth in which Napier writes "I have put down my thoughts after yesterday's meeting, 26/2/44, which may be of interest to you" [See also SZ/AEAF/1/8/3-4].
Napier's paper sets out briefly the object, period of activity, targets, area of attack, and effect of attack, for air operations in support of Operation Overlord for the preparatory and operation phases of Overlord. In conclusion he warns that "We must neither underestimate nor overestimate the results of this bombing policy [the AEAF Transportation Plan]. One thing is certain - any half policy would have virtually no effect; results are achieved only after the elastic limit of the Transportation system has been passed."
He judges the maximum effect of the policy as the prevention og "any massive prolongation of the struggle in N.W. FRANCE" and the minimum to "have hampered his [the enemy's] conduct of the campaign and war effort in N. FRANCE, while the weakening of his locomotive power position may affect other fronts... These effects have to be weighed against the alternative uses of air power in support of the campaign."
Napier's paper sets out briefly the object, period of activity, targets, area of attack, and effect of attack, for air operations in support of Operation Overlord for the preparatory and operation phases of Overlord. In conclusion he warns that "We must neither underestimate nor overestimate the results of this bombing policy [the AEAF Transportation Plan]. One thing is certain - any half policy would have virtually no effect; results are achieved only after the elastic limit of the Transportation system has been passed."
He judges the maximum effect of the policy as the prevention og "any massive prolongation of the struggle in N.W. FRANCE" and the minimum to "have hampered his [the enemy's] conduct of the campaign and war effort in N. FRANCE, while the weakening of his locomotive power position may affect other fronts... These effects have to be weighed against the alternative uses of air power in support of the campaign."
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SZ - Zuckerman Archive
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SZ/AEAF - [Allied Expeditionary Air Force]
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SZ/AEAF/4 - War Office and 21 A. G. [Plans and Comments]
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SZ/AEAF/4/1 - War Office and 21 A.G. 21 A.G. Plans for Delay of Reserves. Napier's Views
- SZ/AEAF/4/1/4-5 - Air Attacks on Railways, 25/2/44
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SZ/AEAF/4/1 - War Office and 21 A.G. 21 A.G. Plans for Delay of Reserves. Napier's Views
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SZ/AEAF/4 - War Office and 21 A. G. [Plans and Comments]
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SZ/AEAF - [Allied Expeditionary Air Force]
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