SZ/AEAF/3/3/2-3 - Operation "Overlord". Attacks on Rail Centres, 19/2/44
SZ/AEAF/3/3/2-3
Item
Operation "Overlord". Attacks on Rail Centres, 19/2/44
1944
2 pp.
Great Britain. Air Ministry. Bomber Operations. Director.
D. of I. (O)/111/44
Paper setting out the views of the Director of Intelligence (Operations), Air Ministry on A.E.A.F.'s proposal "that heavy attacks should be made from now onwards on some 70-90 railway centres in Northern France, Belgium and Western Germany... on the ground that these attacks would greatly help the successful accomplishment of Operation 'OVERLORD'." His view is that "As a scheme for the annihilation of rail facilities it is admirable, but I am not satisfied that it will have a useful effect on Operation 'Overlord'." He goes on to point out the way in which the AEAF plan expands "a reasonably modest origin" in 21 Army Group's request that AEAF "considers the possibility" of cutting railway roads to the invasion area so as to force German troops to detrain 100-150 miles from the Front and, in his view, causes the original object "to have been lost sight of in a general desire to injure the enemy's rail system as much as possible." He also warns of the effect of a diversion of bomber effort away from other target systems.
Two copies.
Paper setting out the views of the Director of Intelligence (Operations), Air Ministry on A.E.A.F.'s proposal "that heavy attacks should be made from now onwards on some 70-90 railway centres in Northern France, Belgium and Western Germany... on the ground that these attacks would greatly help the successful accomplishment of Operation 'OVERLORD'." His view is that "As a scheme for the annihilation of rail facilities it is admirable, but I am not satisfied that it will have a useful effect on Operation 'Overlord'." He goes on to point out the way in which the AEAF plan expands "a reasonably modest origin" in 21 Army Group's request that AEAF "considers the possibility" of cutting railway roads to the invasion area so as to force German troops to detrain 100-150 miles from the Front and, in his view, causes the original object "to have been lost sight of in a general desire to injure the enemy's rail system as much as possible." He also warns of the effect of a diversion of bomber effort away from other target systems.
Two copies.
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SZ - Zuckerman Archive
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SZ/AEAF - [Allied Expeditionary Air Force]
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SZ/AEAF/3 - [Air Ministry]
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SZ/AEAF/3/3 - [Air Ministry. Unfavourable comments and counter-comments]
- SZ/AEAF/3/3/2-3 - Operation "Overlord". Attacks on Rail Centres, 19/2/44
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SZ/AEAF/3/3 - [Air Ministry. Unfavourable comments and counter-comments]
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SZ/AEAF/3 - [Air Ministry]
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SZ/AEAF - [Allied Expeditionary Air Force]