SZ/AEAF/2/1/1 - [Letter, SZ to Sir Arthur Tedder, 18/2/44]
SZ/AEAF/2/1/1
Item
[Letter, SZ to Sir Arthur Tedder, 18/2/44]
1944
1 leaf
Tedder, Arthur William, recipient
The writer, believed to be SZ, refers to "recent meetings" at which the view has been expressed that diversion of bomber effort from attacks on German towns and industry [in execution of the Point blank Directive] to preparatory tasks in support of Operation Overlord would be a disaster.
With reference to MOHS RE Department assessments the achievement of air attacks on Germany is examined critically in relation to arguments attributed to the US Strategical Air Forces and RAF Bomber Command that such attacks "would end the war on their own" or "prove the winning factor". In particular a survey "which is being formally published this coming week, and which has already been laid in manuscript before the Air Ministry, Bomber Command and the U.S. Strategical Air Forces in Europe" is quoted to support the contention that "the total effects of the raids in Germany would still not appear phenomenal". Estimates of loss of production in German industry effected by the Point blank offensive are extrapolated to "the three month period in which we are concerned" and it is judged that attacks "would... hardly amount to more than a 4% effect on overall production". The writer concludes by addressing the issue of the Strategic air offensive and German morale, the time of the breaking of which "is anybody's guess".
Typescript carbon copy. [SZ/AEAF/2/1/2] is a revised version dated 28/2/44.
With reference to MOHS RE Department assessments the achievement of air attacks on Germany is examined critically in relation to arguments attributed to the US Strategical Air Forces and RAF Bomber Command that such attacks "would end the war on their own" or "prove the winning factor". In particular a survey "which is being formally published this coming week, and which has already been laid in manuscript before the Air Ministry, Bomber Command and the U.S. Strategical Air Forces in Europe" is quoted to support the contention that "the total effects of the raids in Germany would still not appear phenomenal". Estimates of loss of production in German industry effected by the Point blank offensive are extrapolated to "the three month period in which we are concerned" and it is judged that attacks "would... hardly amount to more than a 4% effect on overall production". The writer concludes by addressing the issue of the Strategic air offensive and German morale, the time of the breaking of which "is anybody's guess".
Typescript carbon copy. [SZ/AEAF/2/1/2] is a revised version dated 28/2/44.
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SZ - Zuckerman Archive
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SZ/AEAF - [Allied Expeditionary Air Force]
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SZ/AEAF/2 - [Tedder and SHAEF Control]
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SZ/AEAF/2/1 - [Tedder and SHAEF Control. General appreciation for ACM Tedder of Point Blank as opposed to Overlord]
- SZ/AEAF/2/1/1 - [Letter, SZ to Sir Arthur Tedder, 18/2/44]
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SZ/AEAF/2/1 - [Tedder and SHAEF Control. General appreciation for ACM Tedder of Point Blank as opposed to Overlord]
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SZ/AEAF/2 - [Tedder and SHAEF Control]
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SZ/AEAF - [Allied Expeditionary Air Force]
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